U.S. Boat Strike Campaign: Questions Congress Should Ask

Below is a list of questions that should be answered by U.S. government officials regarding the lethal campaign against suspected drug trafficking individuals, groups, and vessels that began on Sept. 2. The gravity of these events demands that these be answered by officials with knowledge.

Note: Some of the questions below assume the U.S. official responding will take the view that the United States is in one or more armed conflicts with cartels or criminal gangs. As a matter of law, the United States is not in an armed conflict with any such groups, and the law of armed conflict (otherwise called international humanitarian law, IHL) does not apply to these operations.

A. Campaign as a Whole

Which drugs and what quantity:
The Trump administration has sought to justify the strikes as necessary to counter the illicit sale of drugs in the United States, particularly fentanyl, given some such drugs end up harming or killing Americans. It is not known which drugs, and in what quantities, are being targeted. 

1. Is there a type of drug that has to be known to be on board for a vessel to be targeted? 

2. A quantity?

3. How do you know the type of drugs on board?

4. The quantity?

5. What level of confidence is required in intelligence assessments on these questions?

6. Do you believe that any level of drug trafficking, from any place and to any location, constitutes taking up arms against the United States? If not, what is the level, what is the place, and location?

Destination of vessels and drug sales: 

7. Do you have to know the destination of the vessel for it to be targeted? Or the onward location for sale of the drugs?

8. Secretary Rubio has said much of the cocaine being targeted is headed for sale in Europe. Is it your assessment that go-fast boats ferrying drugs for sale in Europe are engaged in hostilities against the United States? 

9. What percentage of fentanyl coming into the United States is from Venezuela?

10. What percentage of fentanyl coming into the United States is due to Tren de Aragua (TdA)?

11. What percentage of cocaine coming into the United States is from Venezuela?

12.What percentage of cocaine coming into the United States is due to Tren de Aragua?

13. Do these groups present a threat of armed attack against the United States? 

14. Is there any evidence or surveillance footage of weapons on any of these boats? If so, how often?

15. Are any of these boats capable of reaching the United States without refueling?

16. What level of confidence is required in intelligence assessments on these questions? 

17. Is the intelligence community uniform in these assessments?

What groups may be targeted and why: 

18. Which specific groups is the military authorized to target under the Execute Order (EXORD) for this operation? How many of those groups have been targeted to date?

19. Do the EXORD or any other operational documents specify which groups or persons can be targeted? Which groups? Which persons?

20. Do the EXORD or any other operational documents make any distinction for U.S. citizens or U.S. persons who can be deliberately targeted in an attack? Who can be killed incidentally in an attack?

21. Is there a “Declared Hostile Force” (DHF) identified in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) (or more than one)?  What is it/are they?

22. Have any of these groups aimed lethal force at the U.S. military or civilians? If so, can you specify what occurred? 

23. Have any of these groups sought to militarily control territory within the United States?

24. To your knowledge, have any of these groups stated an intention to engage in armed conflict with the United States?

25. What is the definition of an “affiliate” or “associate” of TdA who is not a member of the group?

26. What level of confidence is required in intelligence assessments on these questions? 

27. Is the intelligence community uniform in this assessment?

28. On Sept. 3, Secretary Rubio stated, “These drug cartels, what they do is they know they’re going to lose 2% of their cargo;” “They bake it into their economics. What will stop them is when you blow them up.” Is that a fairly accurate description of the reason the administration turned to the use of lethal operations? Is the idea that interdictions do not deter the cartels but killing people they pay to carry their drugs does?

Who qualifies as an “unlawful combatant”?
The administration has claimed it is striking “unlawful combatants” involved in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) with the United States. 

29. Does an individual need to be a “member” of one of the 24 newly listed DTOs/FTOs to qualify as an “unlawful combatant”?

30. What criteria suffice for someone to be considered a “member”?

31. Can a person be targeted for running drugs for profit if they are not themselves a “member” of the cartel/gang but the drugs belong to the cartel/gang?

32. Would communication with members of one of the 24 groups regarding selling drugs they control be sufficient to determine that a person is targetable?

33. Have any government lawyers raised concerns about whether any of the individuals on the boats should be considered civilians pre-strike?

34. Have any government lawyers raised concerns about whether any of the individuals on the boats should be considered civilians post-strike?

35. What is the Area of Operations (AO) under the EXORD?  Is it limited to the Caribbean and the Pacific? 

36. Are traffickers crossing the southern border on land targetable with lethal force?

37. What constitutes “directly participating in hostilities” (DPH)?  Low level drug dealers?  Users?  Unwitting or unwilling mules? 

What are the strike criteria? Are there limits on who may be targeted?

38. How many forms of positive identification of the combatant/DHF are required before the military may engage with lethal force? 

39. What level of certainty is required before an individual is targeted?

40. Are there age requirements?  Gender requirements?

41. Are “affiliates” of “members” of a cartel targetable? What about “affiliates” of “affiliates”?

42. What does the ROE say about the non-combatant casualty cut-off value (NCV)?

43. Who is the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) for the campaign?  Is this delegable?  Has it been delegated? 

44. If so, were any of such delegations rescinded or other authorities changed following the Oct. 16 attack in which two survivors were rescued? 

45. SOUTHCOM’s social media feed has stated that certain strikes were executed on the orders of Secretary Hegseth (e.g., Nov. 10 and Nov. 15).  Secretary Hegseth has stated on his social media feed that certain strikes were executed on the orders of the President (e.g., Oct. 3, 19, 21, 22, 24, 28, 29 and Nov. 1, 4, 6, 10). Who makes the determination for who is responsible for each strike? 

How do you assess whether a strike was successful? 

46. Do interdictions succeed at seizing drugs being unlawfully trafficked into the United States?

47. If your goal is to stop the drugs from entering the United States, would Coast Guard-led, Navy-supported interdictions do so?  Hasn’t that been happening successfully for years, and as recently as August 2025?

48. What is the most accurate assessment of how many American lives, if any, are saved by each boat destroyed?  How are you determining that?

49. If your goal is to kill low-level drug runners, would you also support using lethal force to target low-level drug runners selling drugs obtained through the same cartels/gangs within the United States? If not, why not?

50. For DOJ officials: Why is the Department of Justice deporting drug mules instead of prosecuting them?  Why aren’t they being charged with “terrorism” offenses?  Are we deporting other types of “terrorists?”

51. How much fentanyl coming into the United States has been reduced by the U.S. military strikes on Tren de Aragua affiliated boats? How much fentanyl coming into the United States has been reduced by all U.S. military strikes on suspected drug boats since Sept. 2?

52. How much cocaine coming into the United States has been reduced by the U.S. military strikes on Tren de Aragua affiliated boats? How much cocaine coming into the United States has been reduced by  all U.S. military strikes on suspected drug boats since Sept. 2?

53. Why weren’t the survivors of the Oct. 16 attack detained, for intelligence purposes or otherwise? Does intelligence gathering play any role in these missions?

Armed attack and self-defense:
The United States has claimed in communications to Congress and at the UN Security Council that it has suffered an armed attack giving rise to the right of self-defense under Art. 51 of the UN Charter. It has not explained the specifics of any “armed attack” or how necessity and proportionality are considered. 

54. Is it your assessment that the United States has suffered an armed attack that gives rise to a right to target these boats or people in self-defense? 

55. If so, what was the armed attack, specifically? 

56. By whom was it perpetrated, specifically? 

57. What were the goals of the group(s) and the attack as you understand them? 

58. In your view, how is targeting the individuals and boats “necessary” in self-defense if interdiction in order to stop the drugs and the people is an available (and ongoing) option?

59. How are you applying the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (proportionality, distinction, military necessity, and the prevention of unnecessary suffering)?

Partners, allies and others:

60. Has any other State requested the United States to engage in these lethal operations?

61. Which foreign governments have expressed concerns about the legality of these U.S. military operations?

62. Which foreign governments have made clear that their intelligence partnerships with the United States are not to include use of their collection or analysis in these strikes?

63. Which foreign governments have changed their counter-narcotics intelligence sharing with the United States since Sept. 2? How so?

64. Which foreign governments have changed their support for or participation with U.S. counternarcotics operations since Sept. 2? How so?

65. Are other countries justified in using lethal force within the United States against gun and drug traffickers? 

Drugs as related to hostile acts or armed attacks:

66. Is it your understanding that those who sell drugs in the United States are motivated by profit?

67. Is it your belief that selling drugs for profit, knowing some of them will harm or kill Americans, constitutes an armed attack? A hostile act? 

68. If so, on what basis specifically? To your knowledge, are there any past examples of the United States – or any other State – considering such actions constitute hostile actions or an armed attack?

69. Could selling other substances that knowingly end up causing the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans each year qualify as hostile acts? As armed attacks?

• • What about selling illegal guns knowing some will kill Americans (causing more than 45,000 deaths per year)?  
  • What about tobacco (causing approximately 480,000 deaths per year)? 
  • What about motor vehicles (more than 40,000 deaths per year)?

Other questions about legal advice

70. Have any government lawyers raised concerns about the legality of the operations?

71. Have any government lawyers raised concerns about whether it is accurate to claim the United States is in a “non-international armed conflict” with any of the groups?

72. Have any government lawyers raised concerns about whether it is accurate to claim TdA has engaged in “armed attacks” against the United States?

73. Have any government lawyers been told to address only some legal issues and not to address other legal issues (such as jus ad bellum, or the law governing the resort to armed force) but instead, in effect, to treat the latter as resolved?

74. Were any government lawyers not included in the legal assessment who would ordinarily be included in past administrations?

75. A senior administration official reportedly told the Washington Post that “[t]he [OLC] opinion ‘memorialized a decision taken by a restricted interagency lawyers group’ made up of four career lawyers, including two uniformed military attorneys, and four political appointees … “The group unanimously concluded that ongoing actions are a legally available option for the president.’” 

• • Is that accurate? If not, how not?
  • When did the meeting take place? 
  • Which agencies and departments were represented?
  • Who personally participated? Who else had direct knowledge of the meeting? 
  • How were the participants chosen?
  • Who selected them?
  • What is meant by a “restricted” interagency lawyers group?
  • Were there any differences in the decision taken at that meeting and the written OLC opinion in September?
  • Is Tim Parlatore considered one of those uniformed attorneys?
  • Were those at the meeting told to assume certain facts as true? Which facts?
  • What is meant by “ongoing actions”? Targeting the drugs, the people, the vessels, or some combination of those? Does that include targeting only groups recognized as “organized armed groups” such as ELN in Colombia, or all 24 groups named in the OLC opinion?

B. The September 2 Strikes

Your assessment of TdA’s actions:
The September 2nd strike was stated to have targeted and killed 11 TdA members. 

76. On what basis do you believe that TdA is in hostilities with the United States? (Note: I am not interested in what label has been applied to the group, but their actual conduct as you understand it.)

77. Was your pre-strike assessment that all 11 people on the boat were “members” of TdA? 

1. • If yes, how was that confirmed prior to the strike? How is membership in TdA determined?
   • Based on what you know about TdA, is it customary for TdA to pay 11 separate people to act as drug mules on a single transport?
   • Was any of your intelligence source from “rival” or other groups or criminal organizations?
   • If not, on what basis were they targeted?

78. Based on yourpost-strike assessment, how many of the 11 people on the boat were “members” of TdA? How many were “affiliates” of TdA? 

79. What is the definition of affiliation or association used for this strike?

80. Do you believe members of TdA are trained to conduct armed violence against the United States? 

81. Do you think the administration has a responsibility to inform Americans if U.S. intelligence agencies determine some of the 11 people may not have been members of or affiliated with TdA? Is there a responsibility to correct the record ifU.S. officials have publicly stated facts that turn out not to be true?

82. Where were the “members” of TdA going on Sept. 2?

83. TdA has only been publicly referenced in the first strike on Sept. 2.  Which groups were involved in each subsequent strike?

Operational guidance regarding survivors: 

84. Do the EXORD or any other operational documents specify what should be done if there are shipwrecked survivors? 

• • Have there been changes made during this campaign to operational documents to specify what should be done if there are shipwrecked survivors? 
  • If so, when were those changes made and on what basis?

Target of Sept. 2 strike: 

85. What was the target? Were the people on board the boat the target or the boat itself or the drugs on board or some combination of those? 

86. Was the boat carrying drugs? What type and how much?

87. Do you have any reason to believe the boat may have also been trafficking people?At what time did you first positively identify (PID) the target?

88. How did you establish PID?

89. Was Secretary Hegseth present when you first established PID?

90. Where was the target geographically when you first established PID?  Where was it geographically when you executed the strike?  What was its destination?

Hegseth orders: 

91. Did Secretary of Defense Hegseth give the order to “kill them all” or “kill everyone” or anything similar? 

92. When?

93. To whom? 

94. Who else heard or knew of this order?

95. Who is the Declared Hostile Force, if any, under the ROE?

96. Did Hegseth author any portion of the ROE?  Who did?

Target engagement authority: 

97. Who was the target engagement authority (TEA)? 

98. What role did that person play in the operation?

99. Did they approve the first strike? The second? The third? The fourth?

100. Was TEA delegated at any time during this strike, or any others?

101. Where was the TEA at the time of the strike?

102. Where was Admiral Bradley at the time of the strike?

103. Where was General Caine at the time of the strike?

104. Did the TEA have a legal advisor?  Who was it?

105. Did Admiral Bradley have a legal advisor?  Who was it?

106. Did General Caine have a legal advisor?  Who is it?

107. Where were the relevant legal advisors located at the time of the strike?  Did they approve of the strike?

Aircraft and weaponry:

108. What aircraft prosecuted the strike?  

109. From where did it depart before beginning the mission? From what unit?

110. What was its payload on the day of the Sept. 2 strike?  

111. How long could the aircraft stay on mission (before needing to refuel, be reassigned, etc.)? 

112. What munition was used for the first, second, third, and fourth strike?  (Or any others.)

113. Was there a second form of surveillance, beyond the firing aircraft’s own camera, covering the target at the time of the strike?  What was it? 

Identification of survivors: 

114. What was the battle damage assessment (BDA) from the first strike?  Where was that information logged?

115. When was it determined there were survivors? 

116. What were they doing?

117. Were they injured? In or out of the water?

118. Was the boat navigable?  How do you define that?

119. Was Secretary of Defense Hegseth watching the strike live? For how long? Who else was in the room with him? Who else was directly in communication with him at the time?

120. What, if anything, did your legal advisor(s) tell you about the survivors?

121. What constitutes “shipwrecked,” in your opinion?

Calling for help as “hostile action” and retrieving cocaine as “active combat activity”:

122. What would a survivor of a strike who is shipwrecked at sea have to do in your view to show they are not “in the fight”? There is no flag to raise and there are no weapons to drop. Are they supposed to not call anyone to rescue them?

123. Is it your belief that a shipwrecked survivor of a strike communicating with a cartel member that they need to be rescued to avoid drowning at sea is a “hostile act” or demonstrates “hostile intent”? Why? 

124. If it is your view that the United States is in an armed conflict against TdA and other groups, and if such groups are declared hostile forces (DHF) in the relevant ROE: Are declared hostile forces protected by the Geneva Conventions?  Can declared hostile forces be considered shipwrecked?

125. Do you view retrieving cocaine as “active combat activity”? If so, on what basis could it qualify as such?

126. Do submersibles and other watercraft come equipped with radios meant to survive a shipwreck?  Are U.S. servicemembers targetable if they survive a shipwreck and call for help?

Concerns raised: 

127. Did anyone involved in the Sept. 2 attack raise concerns about striking survivors before the follow-on strikes were ordered? Before they were launched? 

128. How were those concerns communicated?  (Verbal, digital, etc.)

129. Did anyone involved in the Sept. 2 attack raise concerns about striking survivors after the strike?  If so, who, when, and how?

130. The New York Times reported that “military officials had used a written texting system … to communicate … during planning scenarios ahead of the attack.” In the planning sessions, what were the different scenarios for killing survivors? 

131. Did the military draw any lessons learned from the Sept. 2 strike that were considered by some to be mistakes made? What were those?

132. How did subsequent planning scenarios for handling survivors change, if at all, after the Sept. 2 strike?

Timeline between strikes and who was present: 

133. How much time passed between strikes?

134. Did the same aircraft stay on target to conduct BDA?  

135. How soon after these kinds of strikes does the smoke generally clear so one can see, for example, survivors? 

136. Was the boat on fire after the first strike?  The second?  The third?  The fourth? 

137. What was on Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s schedule that he turned to after the first strike?

138. Who watched any of the Sept. 2 strikes live? 

Briefing:

139. When was President Donald Trump briefed on the strike and what happened?  Who briefed him?  Was he briefed on the survivors after the initial strike?

140. When were members of Congress first briefed? Who was given what information ?  Were they briefed about the survivors of the Sept. 2 strike?

C. The Targeting Process and Whether and How It Has Changed

141. What was every target locked on before the launch of each strike on Sept 2?

142. Does DOD/JSOC/SOUTHCOM have all the normal data documenting every launch and video showing every target locked on before each launch?

143. After the September 2 strike, did the U.S. military adopt a different policy/posture toward survivors of these strikes? 

• Background: The Oct. 16 strike included two survivors (held on a U.S. Navy warship until transferred to Colombia and Ecuador on October 18). An Oct. 27 strike left one survivor (SOUTHCOM reportedly initiated Search and Rescue standard protocols for the lone survivor before transferring the mission to the Mexican Navy, which eventually called off search efforts for the individual, who is now presumed dead.)It has been reported that the United States is using -AGM-114 Hellfire missiles to attack these vessels. What mode are the missiles deployed in? Have they been placed in a “blast fragment” or “airburst” mode? What model of AGM-114 has been used?

144. Did the U.S. military use anti-personnel or anti-material munitions in the first strike, second strike, third, any of these strikes/attacks?

145. What munitions were used in the other strikes?  How much do they cost per unit?

146. How many strikes have been taken in total?

147. After Sept. 2, has the U.S. military ever engaged in a follow-on strike with survivors present at the target site?

FEATURED IMAGE: WASHINGTON, DC – JUNE 18: U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth arrives to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in the Dirksen Senate Office Building on June 18, 2025 in Washington, DC. The Committee met to hear testimony on the proposed budget request for fiscal year 2026 and the future year’s defense program for the Department of Defense. (Photo by Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images)