A crash between a tractor-trailer and a “party bus” in the early morning of Dec. 16, 2022, prompted the National Transportation Safety Board to recommend more technology on trucks.
At 1:36 a.m. that day, a tractor-trailer owned and operated by Triton Logistics was traveling east on Interstate 64 and hit a slow-moving, mid-sized party bus near Williamsburg, Va. According to a final report on the crash released by the NTSB in August, the 69-mph speed-limited truck was traveling between 65 and 70 mph, and the bus was traveling between 20 and 25 mph.
The report states that the truck driver did not brake or take any evasive action before he struck the rear of the bus. The collision caused the roof and sidewalls of the bus to separate from the vehicle, leaving the passenger compartment exposed.
NTSB investigators report that the truck driver’s lack of response to the slow-moving bus was due to “fatigue from excess driving time and lack of sleep opportunity.” The slow speed of the bus was due in part to a partially blocked prescreen fuel filter. The NTSB credits the slow speed of the bus with increasing the severity of the crash.
The crash left three bus occupants dead, nine with serious injuries and 11 more with minor injuries. The truck driver, who was alone, also sustained serious injuries.
HOS and ELDs
The NTSB took a deep dive into the hours-of-service records of the truck driver. The investigation revealed that the day of the crash was the seventh consecutive day the driver was on duty. The investigators also noted in the three days before the crash, the truck driver had the opportunity to sleep seven-and-a-half, four and seven hours per day.
“However, the available sleep opportunities were brief and non-consecutive throughout the day, lasting between one and five hours,” the report states.
The truck was equipped with a dash cam that captured not only the crash but also the truck crossing the solid white line nine times in the three minutes before the crash.
Investigators discovered that Triton Logistics created fictious driver accounts for its electronic logging devices that “enabled drivers to operate beyond federal regulations, creating an opportunity for fatigued driving.”
The ELD profile in use for the truck driver involved in the crash was very similar to one created for a co-driver, according to the report.
“The driver’s license number and state were the same for the driver and co-driver. The driver’s login was his last name followed by his first name and number 2 with no spaces; the co-driver’s login was the same with the addition of letters ‘tl’ at the end of the driver’s login,” the report states.
When questioned by NTSB investigators, the truck driver claimed to have dropped off his co-driver just before the crash. However, further investigation found that the alleged co-driver had been dismissed by Triton for the eight days preceding the crash.
“The NTSB conducted a phone interview with the alleged co-driver, who stated that he did not know the crash-involved driver and had never occupied the truck with him or driven long-distance trips for Triton,” the report states. “Instead, he had been a local driver based at Triton’s Virginia location and did not routinely use an ELD.”
The driver of the truck involved in the crash told investigators that Triton officials had told him if he exceeded his allowed driving hours, he was to stop and call the HOS department. Triton employees then would log the driver out of the ELD and log in a new driver, according to the report. Additional Triton employees interviewed by the NTSB said they were given similar instructions by the company.
Other notable discoveries
The driver of the bus was 23 years old and did not hold a commercial driver’s license or a passenger endorsement. The Class D license he did hold was suspended at the time of the crash.
The bus driver did not routinely work for the bus company, Futrell’s Party Adventures, but rather filled in from time to time. Investigators were unable to find any documents detailing the driver’s training. Additionally, Futrell’s did not have a training program.
In addition to the improperly licensed driver, Futrell’s had not been granted operating authority with the state of Virginia at the time of the crash, although it had applied for this authority.
Following the crash, investigators with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration needed to determine if a compliance review was necessary. The agency was provided a letter stating that Futrell’s was no longer operating a passenger carrier.
Recommendations
The NTSB outlined a number of recommendations centering on HOS compliance, fatigue management, improving the motor carrier’s safety “culture” and detailing a number of automated “driver-assistance systems.”
The safety board recommended an expansion of the ELD regulations not only to monitor the date, time and individual associated with each log-in but also to record such data. Additionally, investigators recommended using driver-facing cameras to enhance driver training.
Not surprisingly, the carrier’s lack of automated collision-avoidance systems was high on the list, as well. While these systems aren’t mandated and weren’t on the Triton truck, the NTSB continues its push for technology like automatic emergency braking and adaptive cruise control.
NTSB
The National Transportation Safety Board is not a regulatory agency; it is an investigative arm. While the board puts out a “most wanted” list of regulations annually, crash investigations also typically include a number of recommendations.
However, regulatory agencies are under no obligation to incorporate the recommendations. LL
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